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 The ISEAGE environment is an advanced test-bed designed to allow researchers to 
play out real attacks against real machines without endangering any outside networks.  Along 
with this test-bed comes the need for tools to utilize the environment and to help advance and 
grow the overall ISEAGE system.  An important tool to have in any such test-bed 
environment such as ISEAGE is the ability to replay traffic from previous sessions.  More 
specifically it is important to have the ability to replay attack traffic.  It is this need that 
created the Intrusion Collector and Emulator (ICE). 
 ICE is a system comprised of three main components; Snort, MySQL, and a custom 
piece of software called the Replayer.  These three pieces come together to form a cohesive 
unit that allows users to capture and store attack traffic for later study and use.  The Replayer 
can then retrieve any and all of the attacks and replay them.  This gives researchers using 
ISEAGE a valuable tool that will allow them to capture attacks from various real world sites 
using Snort, and then study their effects on machines and networks as they replay those same 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The research being done in the fields of computer and network security is expanding 
more and more in this day and age.  Along with this increase in research comes new 
facilities; one of them being the Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment 
(ISEAGE) [1].  ISEAGE is a unique research test-bed located at Iowa State University that 
allows for real attacks to be carried out against real computers in a controlled area that 
mimics the Internet.  Similar to any new test-bed of this kind, in order to take full advantage 
of the ISEAGE environment, new tools and devices need to be created. 
 
1.1 ISEAGE Tools 
 Several tools have already been created and put into use in the ISEAGE environment.  
The most notable tool is the Traffic Mapper created by Dr. Doug Jacobson.  It is the 
backbone of ISEAGE and gives it the ability to route and handle the network traffic running 
on the ISEAGE network.  A simple traffic generation tool created by Noah Korba has also 
been put into use to help manufacture background traffic during various ISEAGE events.  As 
on the real Internet, there is always an abundance of traffic that does not belong to each user 
and the traffic generation tool helps to emulate that on ISEAGE.  Another tool also in use at 
the ISEAGE facility is the visualization software written by Nate Karstens.  This software is 
used primarily during Cyber Defense Competitions (CDC) [2] and helps the CDC 
participants and visitors see what type of traffic is currently on the network and the most 
recent scores.  Figure 1 shows some of the tools in use and in development for ISEAGE.   
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Figure 1. ISEAGE Tools and Environment 
These tools were developed out of necessity for ISEAGE and there are many other tools that 
are needed as well to give ISEAGE the diversity it requires to function as an advanced test-
bed.  One tool required is the ability to replay attacks that have been captured in previous 
traffic sessions from either the ISEAGE facility or a corporate network.   
 
1.2 Replaying Traffic 
 Replaying all types of network traffic is very important in any test-bed environment 
similar to ISEAGE as it gives the researchers the ability to study different parts of the traffic 
stream for varying purposes.  These purposes can range from debugging software, to setting 
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up routers, to testing new services, or many other different needs that may arise and require 
traffic playback.  For ISEAGE, creating quick background traffic on the network or allowing 
previous events held on the ISEAGE network to be studied for future events, are just a few of 
the uses gained by replaying network traffic.  When it comes to replaying attacks, however, a 
specific tool is required apart from a standard traffic replayer. 
 While replaying traffic gives researchers at ISEAGE the aforementioned abilities, 
they also need the ability to study specific attacks and this can not be accomplished by 
replaying an entire traffic session.  Replaying only attack traffic allows researchers to focus 
on the packets associated with each attack and study exactly what happens with each 
machine involved.  At ISEAGE replaying attacks can also be used as a learning tool.  
Replaying attacks back to CDC participants after the competition is just one example of the 
many uses an attack replayer would have. 
  It is the need for a tool that can replay attack traffic that created the Intrusion 
Collector and Emulator (ICE) project.  The goal of ICE is to take the data output from an 
intrusion detection system (IDS), store the resulting attack information into some type of 
database, and have a tool that allows the user to select from the stored attacks and replay 
them onto the ISEAGE network.   
 
1.3 Initial ICE Components 
Monitoring traffic for attacks and replaying network traffic are not new ideas.  There 
are a variety of tools online already that perform both of these functions well.  One such 
monitor is the IDS known as Snort [3] and was considered from the beginning to be used for 
the ICE project.  It is readily available online and has an excellent track record as a reliable 
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IDS.  The initial decision to use Snort came from the suggestion of Dr. Doug Jacobson.  As 
the lead director of the ISEAGE project, Dr. Jacobson was in the position to make sure that 
ICE used components that he thought would benefit the project the most.  As such, he also 
recommended using MySQL [4] as the database software to store the attacks with. 
The first tool looked at to replay traffic was Tcpreplay [5].  At first glance, Tcpreplay 
looked to fit the needs of the ICE project.  It has the ability to replay libpcap [6] dump files 
and Snort does have the ability to output data in a pcap format.  However, it lacks a critical 
function required by ICE.  Tcpreplay takes the whole dump file and will replay specific IP 
addresses the user wants to replay or can replay the entire file.  There is no in depth 
customization available to the user to let them see and choose the individual attacks that they 
wish to replay.  This is a key requirement of the ICE project.  Tcpreplay is a great traffic 
replaying tool but is not an excellent attack replayer for ICE. 
 After more research it became obvious that the problem of replaying attacks from a 
Snort-created database was just a small issue in the overall field of replaying tools.  It also 
became apparent why there was no one replayer that could do everything everyone wanted.  
Unlike Tcpdump which can grab network traffic in any number of ways and can be suitable 
for many different specific monitoring tasks, replaying tools have not reached that level.  To 
understand why, it is necessary to recognize that network attacks will vary tremendously 
from one another and how they are stored will vary as well.  This leads to the problem of 
trying to replicate those attacks in an all in one tool.  Needless to say, it is a very daunting 
task to achieve. 
 What has happened due to this is the development of many different types of attack 
replayer tools that all fulfill different needs.  Each has their own use and specific 
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requirements to run correctly.  The ICE project required Snort to send its output into a 
database so that it would be easy to read through and be easily retrievable for an attack 
replayer.  Due to this very specific requirement set, there were no replaying tools yet 
developed to handle the problem.  Thus, a custom built replayer was necessary and the ICE 
project began to take shape. 
 
1.4 Paper Structure 
 The rest of this paper will be structured as follows.  Chapter 2 will detail the 
background of Snort and the other software components used as part of the ICE project.  
Related tools that have been designed for replaying traffic and attacks will be looked at in 
Chapter 3.  The design and implementation of the Replayer will be covered in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 will go over the testing and evaluation of the Replayer.  This will be followed up 












CHAPTER 2. SOFTWARE BACKGROUND 
 
 In order to fully understand the ICE project and its ultimate goal, it is first necessary 
to give a brief explanation of the organizational makeup of ICE.  There are three major 
components that make up the complete ICE system.  The first component is the intrusion 
detection system Snort.  The second component is the database run by MySQL software 
which stores the output given from Snort.  The final section of ICE is the piece of software 
known as the Replayer, which takes the attack information from the MySQL database and 
replays it.  This chapter will cover Snort and MySQL, discussing primarily their background 
and why they were selected to be used in the ICE project.  Also to be looked at in this section 
is Libnet [7], the library of functions for the C language that was used to create the Replayer, 
and libpcap, another library used to capture packets from a network device. 
 
2.1 Snort 
 The Snort IDS was first developed in 1998 by Martin Roesch [8].  The initial intent of 
Martin was to develop a simple software package that could detect intrusions.  From that 
humble beginning though, Snort has come to have an enormous presence in the security 
sector and is regarded as a solid and highly advanced IDS package.  It was chosen to be used 
for the ICE project due to its large following and support online as well as its ease of use and 
extensive rules package which will be discussed below. 
 Snort has the ability to run as a simple traffic sniffer, a packet logger, and a network 
intrusion detection system (NIDS).  For the purposes of the ICE project, Snort would be used 
exclusively as a NIDS.  There are at least two approaches that can be used in implementing 
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an NIDS. One such method is a heuristic-based NIDS.  This type of NIDS will have a record 
of what normal traffic patterns look like for the network it is monitoring.  When a different 
traffic pattern would present itself on the network, the NIDS would send out an alarm to let 
the administrators know that there is an anomaly in the traffic. 
The Snort NIDS works in a slightly different manner.  It is based on the second type 
of NIDS which is rule-set detection.  Snort operates by using a large library of rules that 
contain information on known attacks.  Snort then takes its rule-set and checks each packet 
on the network against the rules.  If a match occurs, then Snort will alert the administrator 
and log that packet to its output database for observation later.  Typically, each rule is written 
for one type of attack.  This allows the administrator to customize his or her rule-set to watch 
for the type of attack traffic they’re most likely to get at their location. 
 Checking one packet at a time worked well for Snort at the beginning of its inception.  
Later on during its lifecycle in the years of 2001 and 2002 the preprocessor known as 
stream4 was developed.  When Snort operates, it takes each packet through a variety of 
stages when it’s checking them for matches against a rule.  In order to allow Snort to do this 
job more efficiently, preprocessors were developed that would run various jobs on packets 
before they were put into the rule checks.  In this way, it would leave more of Snort’s main 
processing power available to check the rules rather than running various maintenance tasks 
on packets.  The stream4 preprocessor was especially important as it helped to maintain state 
in a TCP stream of packets.  It also allows Snort to reassemble an entire TCP stream and 
check the final payload of the stream against rules rather than checking each packet 
individually.  This enabled Snort to detect attacks that spanned multiple payloads.  This 
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ability becomes of great importance to the creation of the Replayer in the later stages of its 
development. 
 Snort also has also gained the ability to log the information of each offending packet 
over the years.  Currently Snort can take the information from any packet that it detects as a 
threat and store that packet’s information into any number of different formats.  As of this 
writing, it is able to output into a TCPdump style format; a CSV file; any number of 
databases including, but not limited to. MySQL and Oracle; its own unique Unified format; 
along with a variety of small alert log formats.  The Unified format is an important element 
that is unique to Snort and will be discussed in more detail during the design and 
implementation phase in Chapter 4.  As for the database outputs that are available to Snort, 
the only one of interest in the development of ICE was the MySQL output.  This output plug-
in allows Snort to record all of the attack information and warnings along with the packet 
information itself into the MySQL database.  This creates an extensive database that holds all 
of the attack information from a Snort session. 
 
2.2 MySQL 
MySQL is a popular relational database in use today with over 6 million installations.  
The SQL section of MySQL stands for Structured-Query-Language and the language used to 
operate the MySQL database is SQL.  It was initially developed in May of 1995, and has 
gone on to become one of the largest established GPL [9] licensed databases in the world.  
For the ICE project it was selected to be used due to the native support that Snort has for it. 
One of the great advantages of using MySQL is its ability to interface seamlessly with 
website applications.  This was another advantageous reason for using MySQL; it gave me 
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the ability to monitor the database from a website rather than working exclusively on the 
command line with it.  This would become extremely valuable as the database grew in size 
and complex with the amount of attack information stored. 
 
2.3 Libnet 
 The Libnet packet creation library was developed by Mike D. Schiffman to allow for 
the easy and fast development of network related applications.  Specifically, it is a set of 
libraries for the C language that enables the user to create almost all of the major protocols 
that are used with IP based protocols today.  Libnet was designed with only the creation of 
packets taken into consideration.  Unlike the many different socket programming libraries 
available, Libnet has no infrastructure available to receive packets.  There for it is ill-suited 
to create a fully functional networking application all by itself.  However when used with the 
libpcap library, which will be discussed below, it gives the user the ability to create any type 
of networking application they would need. 
 
2.4 Libpcap 
 Libpcap is the name given to the pcap libraries that are used on Unix environments.  
Pcap itself is short for packet capture and has two different ports of it.  The first being the 
aforementioned libpcap and the other being Winpcap which is used for Windows machines.  
The goal of libpcap, and pcap languages in general, is to provide a framework to capture 
packet traffic from the network.  Many different open source tools use these libraries in their 
development including TCPdump and Snort.  Libpcap was chosen to be used for an add-on 
module that was created late in the development cycle of the Replayer.  This will be 
 10
discussed later on in Chapter 4 when the implementation and design aspects of the ICE 























CHAPTER 3. RELATED WORK 
 
 Before probing into the inner workings of the layout and design of the ICE project, it 
is important to acknowledge and report on the status of the other tools that have been created 
to address the issue of replaying attack traffic.   This chapter will cover two specific tools that 




 Tcpreplay has already been mentioned briefly in the introduction and will therefore 
be covered first.  As was stated in Chapter 1, Tcpreplay functions by taking the output from 
the program Tcpdump, which uses the libpcap libraries to capture traffic from the network.  
Tcpreplay has many options available to its user and has undergone tremendous development 
in the last few years.  It has turned into a stable replaying system and will continue to 
improve in the future. 
 Unfortunately it is the output from Snort and Tcpdump, and the fact that Tcpreplay 
was in a very preliminary stage at the start of the ICE project, which hindered using it in the 
ICE project.  Snort is capable of having its session information formatted into the same 
Tcpdump pcap format for output.  This would permit for Tcpreplay to then take that session 
information and replay it.  However, it gives no options to the user on what attack to replay 
and which specific packets are linked to each attack.  In order for a user to determine which 
packets were linked to each attack, they would have to manually go through the session 
output and match up each packet with its associated tag in the warning log created by Snort.  
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This could also be scripted if necessary but is an extremely long and tedious way to gather 
the information from a Snort session.  That is why the output from Snort was sent to a 
MySQL database instead; it gives the user a much easier way of navigating and processing 
the information taken from Snort.  By using the MySQL output on Snort, Tcpreplay was 
removed as an option, not for its lack of replaying functionality, but for its lack of feasibility 
in use with Snort sessions. 
 
3.2 RolePlayer 
The tool known as the RolePlayer [10] was developed at the University of California, 
Berkley by Weidong Cui, Vern Paxson, Nicholas C. Weaver, and Randy H. Katz.  It is a 
relatively new development and is a very sophisticated tool.  Where Tcpreplay and ICE’s 
own Replayer are tools that will replay captured traffic, RolePlayer has not only the ability to 
replay attack traffic, but also to act as the host to incoming attack traffic. 
A key difference between the Replayer and RolePlayer is the method in which each 
tool obtains the attack information they will be replaying.  The Replayer receives the attack 
data to be replayed from the MySQL database, which in turn received its data from Snort.  
The RolePlayer, on the other hand, is trained to replay specific attacks.  The RolePlayer is set 
on a network and has each attack that is to learn run by it.  The RolePlayer then captures the 
traffic session and analyzes the traffic in order for it to replay the attack.  This allows the 
RolePlayer the ability to learn very complex attacks but limits it library of attacks to replay to 
only the ones that it has been trained on and seen before.   
During the training process there are also specific details that the RolePlayer looks for 
in each session.  These details specifically deal with the values that will change when the 
 13
session is replayed.  These can include such variables as time, cookies, a random key, or any 
other such item that might need to be altered when the attack is replayed.  These variables are 
monitored carefully in order for the RolePlayer to maintain the state of each attack that it 
replays.  When replaying an attack that has distinct parts of the packets that are time or 
sessions sensitive, the RolePlayer will modify those areas of the packet which will allow the 
attack to successfully occur.  Again the RolePlayer must be trained for each of these attacks 
and the areas of the packets to look in for the dynamic variables. 
 The RolePlayer can also act as the host and client simultaneously if the user would 
like it to do so.  The example given in [10] describes the RolePlayer receiving attack traffic 
and checking whether or not it is an attack that it has already been trained on.  If it doesn’t 
recognize the attack as a normal variant, it deems it worthy of further study.  It then replays 
the attack traffic it received onto a host machine behind it on the network, in order for further 
testing of the attack to commence.  Otherwise, the RolePlayer will simply drop an attack 
stream if it places it under an already known attack.  It is this versatility and the ability to 
train and replay more advanced attacks that have made the RolePlayer a very unique and 
advanced replay tool. 
 It is the complexity and the way in which the RolePlayer receives its attack 
information that made it unsuitable for use with the ICE system.  The goal of ICE is to 
correctly replay attacks detected and stored by Snort.  With the RolePlayer designed to be 
trained in each attack it is to replay, it can not take the Snort output as an input.  The 
RolePlayer also has more in depth functionality than what was called for the ICE system.  
That is not to say that the RolePlayer is in adequate, it is simply not the correct type of tool to 
use with ICE. 
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CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 The creation of the ICE project was a long and continuous process.  This Chapter will 
focus on the different stages of development each component of ICE went through.  The vast 
majority of this will be spent on the Replayer as most of the development time was dedicated 
to it and it was also undergoing constant revisions and enhancements during the 
implementation phase. 
 In order to organize this chapter into a coherent progression, each stage of 
development will be addressed.  Within each stage, the major work and design of the 
components of ICE shall be gone over in detail.  When that is accomplished, the next stage of 
development along with the various changes and design issues that occurred during that time 
period will be discussed.  This will give the reader a chronological sense of how each piece 
went through development, and the challenges and successes that were overcome and 
achieved respectively, throughout the implementation of the ICE project. 
 
4.1 Stages of Development 
 There were three distinct stages within the development of ICE.  The first stage lasted 
four months and started January of 2005 and ended April of 2005.  This stage occurred 
during the initial senior design team’s work on the project.  The second stage began in June 
of 2005 and lasted until August of 2006.  During this stage, I continued work on ICE as well 
as other smaller projects that I had to attend to.  The third and final stage of development 
lasted from August of 2006 to February of 2007.  It was during this stage that final revisions 
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were put into place and some serious flaws within the Replayer component were discovered 
and corrected. 
 
4.2 Stage One 
 In the fall of 2004, the senior design team consisting of myself, Shawn Rasmussen, 
Adam Hanson, and Li Yeow Chong was charged with developing what at the time was called 
an Attack Collector/Watcher/Replayer for ISEAGE.  During the first semester of the senior 
design class, there was only paper work to be completed for the project.  The actual 
implementation of the Attack Collector/Watcher/Replayer for ISEAGE did not begin until 
the spring of 2005 and at that time the project was also given the name ICE.  The following 
sections will give a detailed overview of the initial design, implementation, and struggles that 
affected the three major components of ICE, Snort, MySQL, and the Replayer, during the 
first phase of development. 
4.2.1 Snort 
   With Snort decided upon as the tool the Replayer would get the attack data from, it 
was necessary to study and research exactly how Snort operated so that it could be 
implemented properly and the correct data could be extracted from its alert logs. 
 With only four months available to the senior design team, the approach to Snort, and 
the other components as well, was simply ‘get it working’.  Getting Snort up and running 
turned out to be one of the easier tasks and took only a few days.  However it would be 
several weeks while different options were looked at and selected in order to get a more 
sufficient output.  Snort was installed on a Red Hat Fedora Core 3 Linux machine that was 
built for the ICE project by the senior design team.  Installing was a minor task and the first 
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output from Snort was written directly to the screen.  This was only done to test Snort and 
would not be continued in the future.  By requiring Snort to write to the screen, it leaves a 
large chance that Snort will drop packets due to the processing time required for writing its 
output to window.  In its place, Snort wrote to alert logs and the senior design team went to 
work studying those and the outputs that were given. 
 In each log there is enough information presented to the user to enable them to 
understand exactly what kind of attack occurred.  There is not, however, enough to recreate a 
packet because there is no payload data represented in each alert entry.  Also the extraction 
of the necessary information from the log to rebuild the attack would not be realistic.  While 
it is feasible to break up a simple log entry, it would not be sufficient when dealing with 
hundreds of log entries.  In short, it would be a naïve way to approach the problem.  
Therefore, the other outputs of Snort were examined.  After consulting Dr. Jacobson, it was 
determined that a MySQL database would be the optimal solution for storing the information 
from the attack traffic.  By using the MySQL output of Snort, we were able to grab the same 
information we would have gotten from the manually dissecting the log entries as well as the 
payload of each packet.  It was a small task to modify the configuration file of Snort to 
produce the correct output to send to the MySQL database.  There was no further research or 
development with the Snort software for the rest of stage one. 
4.2.2 MySQL 
 When the decision to use MySQL was finalized, it became apparent rather quickly 
that no one within our senior design team had any experience with using the database 
software.  Therefore, a large portion of the time spent with the MySQL database was taken to 
bring the group’s knowledge up-to-date on the variety of versions available, as well as the 
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particulars of how to use the SQL language.  The details of the SQL language and how we 
created the queries necessary with it will be discussed later in this paper, specifically in 
section 4.2.3.  While looking over the SQL language, the group followed a variety of setup 
guides found on Snort’s website, and was able to effectively setup the MySQL database in a 
relatively short amount of time. 
 Once the MySQL database software was running, a script was activated to populate it 
with a Snort database.  This contained all of the tables and linking of those tables that was 
required to hold the information coming from Snort.  The next step taken was to give the 
correct privileges to a user that would have access to the database.  This user was then 
designated in the Snort configuration file in order for Snort to input the data into the 
database.  This was the last step taken in dealing with the MySQL setup during senior design 
and no major changes came to the setup until stage two of development. 
4.2.3 Replayer 
 Before looking into the design decisions that took place during the first stage of 
development, it is important to show the total design of the Replayer at that time.  The 
diagram below in Figure 1 shows exactly what modules were planned for this first 
development stage and how each of them interacted to create the entire Replayer component.  
As can be seen, there were three main modules that were to be created; command line 
options module, the MySQL data module, and the packet creation and sending module.  The 
purpose and design of each module will be covered below. 
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Figure 2. Initial Design Modules 
 Installing Fedora Core 3, setting up Snort, and setting up MySQL only took a little 
over two weeks to accomplish in the spring of 2005.  The rest of the time was devoted to 
developing the Replayer.  This occurred in stages with small development goals that would 
be met along the way.  For the initial version of the Replayer that would be completed by the 
end of senior design, there were three main goals.  The first goal was to have the Replayer 
receive command line options that would allow the user to select a port, a destination IP 
address, or a source IP address that would then be used to query the database.  This would 
allow the user to select attacks based on the port used for the attack, the source IP of the 
attack, or the target IP address of the attack. 
The second design goal was to implement SQL queries in the Replayer that were 
capable of grabbing the necessary information from the MySQL database.  The figure in 
Appendix A shows a simplified version of which tables in the database are accessed for the 
various network headers. 
The third and final design goal for the Replayer was to take the Libnet libraries and 
implement the packet creation and writing processes to facilitate the replaying of the attack 
packets.  This was the largest and most complicated goal and would take most of the 




4.2.3.1 Command Line Options and SQL Queries 
 The first step in the creation of the command line options module was to determine a 
way to retrieve the options from the command line itself in a quick and easy manner.  After 
some initial research, our group discovered that a function known as getopt [11] was 
available in the C language.  The getopt function takes the command line arguments given to 
the program as inputs.  The function can then break down each argument and gives the user a 
way of implementing code based on what options are present. This allowed for quick and 
easy coding of a function that could take the output from the getopt function, create the 
necessary variables, and send those over to the SQL queries.  This was accomplished in a 
matter of hours. 
 With the initial command line options completed, the attention of the design team 
turned to the SQL queries.  The first necessity of this design goal called for the group to learn 
SQL.  This was because the queries being used were more complicated than any of us had 
used before.  The reason for such complicated queries arose from the knowledge that 
multiple tables would need to be searched and referenced against each other in order to 
obtain the correct packet data.  As was shown in Appendix B, the entirety of the packet 
information was stored across various tables within the database.  This in turn led to more 
complicated queries being constructed as more tables had to be accessed.  The team took two 
weeks to go over books and study how the SQL language worked and what it took to design 
complicated queries.  After much trial and error, a set of substandard queries were produced 
that were capable of grabbing the IP header information from the MySQL database.  These 
queries would be optimized in the later development stages of ICE. 
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 The queries that were in place at this point in time for the Replayer would 
successfully grab all of the IP headers that matched the port, the destination IP address, or the 
source IP address that was taken from the command line.  When these entries were collected, 
they would be stored into a double array created by the MySQL library.  One array kept track 
of which entry was being looked at, and the other array held the information from each field 
in the IP header.  It was then that the first major design decision occurred.  When the 
database was queried, it would return the all of the IP header entries that matched the query 
used. This process could take anywhere from half a second up to and beyond several minutes 
depending on how many IP header entries matched the query.  It should also be noted that the 
MySQL database only contained in the area of 25,000 packet entries at this point.  A 
database could grow much larger than that if Snort was left to run for an extended period of 
time.   
With that in mind, the decision had to be made as to whether or not all of the IP 
headers, that matched the command line options given by the user, would be collected at the 
beginning of the packet creation process, or if a marker would be used and a query to the 
database would be made each time a new packet was created.  Figure 3 below illustrates the 
two designs that were being considered. 
In design option one, all of the IP header entries are retrieved at the start and the 
double array holding the entries would be checked each time through to determine whether or 
not there were more entries, i.e. more packets, to send.  Design option two in Figure 3, shows 
each IP header being retrieved one at a time.  The Replayer then checks if an entry is 
returned each time through to determine when it has reached the last packets that match the 
options given by the user.  The decision on whether or not to collect all of the IP headers at 
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once or to collect them one at a time, was put off until the packet creation module was 
created and in place. 
 
Figure 3. Two IP Header Retrieval Design Options 
4.2.3.2 Packet Creation 
 In order to understand the packet creation process, it is helps to start by looking at 
Libnet and also understanding where the packet creation functions were placed within the 
entirety of the Replayer as shown in Figure 2.  Libnet itself is based on the idea of creating a 
packet from the ground up.  For example, a TCP/IP packet would be created in the following 
steps; TCP options, TCP payload, TCP header, IP header, write packet to the wire.  An 
amazing quality of the Libnet libraries is the amount of functions that are available to the 
user and the ease at which they can be used.  They require only the information contained in 
 22
the headers and Libnet will build the packet from that information and then write it out to the 
network. 
 Thus, the first step in creating the packet was to grab the necessary information for 
each packet from the MySQL database.  Using the queries developed in the MySQL module, 
the IP header information was retrieved first, and once the current header was successfully 
stored, it would be checked to see what protocol was being used.  In order to keep things as 
simple as possible, only three protocols were supported from the start.  These protocols were 
TCP, UDP, and ICMP.  When the IP header was checked for the protocol, if it did not 
contain one of these three, then the Replayer would stop and generate an error letting the user 
know that an unknown protocol was detected.  This never occurred however due to all of the 
attacks that were stored in the MySQL database falling under one of the three protocols 
mentioned. 
 After the IP header was checked for the protocol that was used, the Replayer would 
then jump to the correct packet creating function based on that protocol.  That is, if a TCP 
protocol was discovered, then the program would go to the TCP creation functions.  This was 
the same for UDP and ICMP.  Once the Replayer had gone into a one of those three 
functions the next step was to then create the protocol headers and options that would be used 
by that particular packet. 
 In the case of a TCP, UDP, or ICMP packet, the method to create the packet headers 
was primarily the same.  The IP header that was used for this packet would be matched up 
with its corresponding transport layer header, or network layer in the case of ICMP, from the 
MySQL database.  This information would then be retrieved from the database using SQL 
queries and would be used to create the packet’s transport layer header.  The queries used in 
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the packet creation functions were developed much faster than the initial queries used to 
retrieve the IP header information at the beginning of the program.  This allowed more work 
to be done on the actual implementation of the headers rather than spending several days 
modifying SQL queries to get the correct result back.  Below is an example of the TCP 
function protocol that is used by Libnet to create the TCP header.  
 
Figure 4. Libnet TCP function prototype 
 
As can be seen by Figure 3, the function requires all of the information that is present 
in a TCP header.  Once all of those variables are passed into the function, it will correctly 
create a TCP header based on that information.  The UDP and ICMP Libnet functions are 
both laid out in similar fashions.  Before the packet’s header could be created though, the 
payload for that packet would have to be retrieved from the database as well.  The payload 
was not retrieved at the same time as the rest of the header information since they are stored 
in different tables. Therefore, before the header creation function was called, the payload was 
retrieved through a sequence of queries that would check if a payload existed and if it did, 
would return that payload to the packet creation function.  A minor obstacle that occurred at 
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this point in the program was due to the formatting of the payload when it was returned from 
the database. 
When using the SQL queries to retrieve the payload, the data was returned in ASCII 
format.  This was because the payload was stored as ASCII in the database to represent the 
hex values of the payload.  This made it easier for someone to peruse the database and the 
payloads, but did not work with the Libnet functions.  In order to get around this, a small 
function was written that returned the equivalent hex value of each ASCII hex character 
represented in the payload.  Once that hex value was returned, it was added onto the current 
payload through a series of bitwise operations.  The character array that would hold the 
payload would start out as a NULL and with each pass through the conversion and transfer 
functions it would gain a byte from the MySQL payload.  The end result of all this was a 
completed payload that was transferred from ASCII to hex, stored in a character array, and 
ready to be used in the Libnet functions.   
Once the transport layer and ICMP protocols were finished, the next step in the 
creation process was the IP header.  The IP header was created through a Libnet function by 
taking the information retrieved from the MySQL database along with the completed 
transport layer (TCP, UDP) or network layer (ICMP) header.  The TCP, UDP, or ICMP 
header’s size had to be determined as well as it was required by the Libnet IP function.  
Because the IP protocol encapsulates them, the headers are used as the payload for the IP 
function.  Below in Figure 5 is the Libnet function protocol for the IP header.  Once again it 
can be seen that it, similar to the TCP Libnet function, only requires the standard information 
of the header to correctly build it.  When that was completed, the only step remaining was to 
write the packet out onto the network. 
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libnet_build_ipv4  (   u_int16_t   len, // Length of Whole Packet
u_int8_t  tos, // Type of Service
u_int16_t  id, // Identifier
u_int16_t  frag, // Fragment flags and offsets
u_int8_t  ttl, // Time to Live
u_int8_t  prot, // Protocol Number
u_int16_t  sum, // Checksum
u_int32_t  src, // Source IP address
u_int32_t  dst, // Destination IP address
u_int8_t *  payload, // Payload
u_int32_t  payload_s, // Payload Size
libnet_t *  l, // Libnet Handle
libnet_ptag_t  ptag // Libnet ID
)  
 
Figure 5. Libnet IP build function prototype 
4.2.3.3 Packet Writing 
Writing the packets out was the easiest part of the entire creation process but was still 
deemed to be a separate module in the Replayer’s design once work on it began.  This can be 
seen as the difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 where the packet creation and packet 
writing module was split into two distinct code groups.  Even with the ease that writing 
packets was accomplished with, it was not without its own set of difficulties.  An important 
aspect of any tool that replays network traffic is timing.  The timing of the replayed packets 
must match the timing of the original packets.  This was made possible for the Replayer to 
accomplish due to Snort storing a timestamp into the MySQL database each time a packet 
was recorded.  This gives the Replayer access to the times of each packet and more 
importantly, the time between the packets it will replay.  In order to send the packets out with 
the correct timing, a simple set of timing controls were written.  These controls had the 
Replayer check the current time and the time of the previous packet if one had been sent.  
The Replayer would then check the timestamp on the previous packet that had been sent and 
the timestamp on the current packet waiting to be written.  From that point, the Replayer 
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would wait the appropriate amount of time that was left after subtracting the timestamps and 
the amount of time that had already passed since the previous packet had been written. 
As for the actual function of writing the packets, while creating the packets, a Libnet 
tag is associated with each individual packet.  After the IP header has been created, this tag is 
passed into another Libnet function that writes that packet out onto the wire.  The Libnet tag 
is then released, and the Replayer jumps back up to check the protocol of the next IP header 
to be written, and starts the process all over again.  The writing of the packets is the simplest 
part of the entire Replayer process. 
4.2.3.4 IP Header Retrieval 
With the packets at this point being created and written to the wire, it brought the 
groups attention back to the problem regarding the initial collection of the IP headers 
mentioned earlier.  The group faced the decision as to whether retrieving all of the matching 
IP headers at once from the database was the best way to go, or whether it was more efficient 
to grab them one at a time from the database after each packet was created and written to the 
wire.  With all of the IP headers grabbed at once, shown as design option one in Figure 3, it 
would relieve the Replayer from having to access the database for the IP headers each time a 
new packet was created and allow it to grab the next IP header from the double array where 
they w.  Using design option one though would create significant wait time at the start of the 
program depending on how many IP headers matched the parameters given by the user and 
by how large the database in use was.   
After several days of testing different types and amounts of packets, it was 
determined that grabbing each IP header individually instead of all at once, as shown in 
design option two in Figure 3, would work for the purposes of the Replayer.  The only 
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concern with this method was whether the SQL queries would be too slow at returning the IP 
headers and disrupt the timing of the packets replaying.  It was seen however, that the SQL 
queries were adequate and returned each entry in a timely manner. 
With that completed, the rest of the semester for the senior design team was spent 
tracking down bugs and monitoring whether or not packets were actually being sent out.  
Testing was done briefly using ethereal [12] to monitor the network.  From what was 
observed at the time, the Replayer was sending out packets, but was not sending out the 
correct payloads and would sometimes have incorrect headers.  This was happening across 
TCP, UDP, and ICMP packets.  Due to time constraints, no further work was done on the 
Replayer as the semester came to an end.  The project was then passed on to me as a thesis 
project and I resumed work on the Replayer in June of 2005.  Thus, phase one of 
development was complete and stage two of development began. 
 
4.3 Stage Two 
 In June of 2005 I took over sole responsibility of the ICE project.  At this point in 
time, a framework had been laid and the rudimentary beginnings of the Replayer were in 
place.  This second phase of development would be the longest of the project and would last 
until August of 2006.  During this time, numerous bug fixes would be implemented along 
with greater functionality and a more precise scope of what exactly the Replayer’s goal was 
to be.  Once again this section will cover Snort, MySQL, and the Replayer and the changes 





 The setup of Snort was not in question at anytime during the first stage of 
development.  It correctly monitored traffic and stored suspicious looking packets into the 
MySQL database.  Therefore, it was not looked at specifically when the next stage of 
development began.  In fact, the first sign that there might be a problem with Snort did not 
arise until September of 2005.  During the summer of 2005, I only devoted a small amount of 
time to the ICE project.  When I was working on ICE, my time was spent tracking down bugs 
and researching SQL so I could better understand how to write a more optimized query to 
help speed up the Replayer.  In August however, testing began on the Libnet functions to 
determine why some packets were incorrect and others were not.  The specifics of those tests 
will be discussed in the Replayer section below.  The results however, deal primarily with 
Snort. 
4.3.1.1 Barnyard 
 It was discovered in September of 2005, that the replayed TCP packets contained 
payloads that were much larger than the MTU of 1500 bytes that is standard on the Ethernet 
protocol.  Looking at the MySQL database it was also discovered that there were payloads of 
TCP packets stored within the database that were larger than the MTU.  After some simple 
deduction, I believed that Snort was storing payloads that were much larger than was 
possible for a single packet to hold.  This fact led to the discovery of the stream4 
preprocessor, which was mentioned in Chapter 2 of this paper. 
 It can be recalled from Chapter 2 that the stream4 preprocessor is responsible for 
recreating the entire stream of the TCP connection.  This allows the Snort software 
mechanism to check the entire payload of the stream for an attack.  This keeps attackers from 
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splitting up attacks through different payloads.  After looking through Snort’s manual, it was 
an obvious fact that the stream4 preprocessor was a required preprocessor for Snort to run 
effectively and would therefore have to remain running.  The obstacle then, was to determine 
how to break up the stored payload to allow for the correct replay of the packets to occur. 
 Before I did much work on fragmentation issue, it turned out, after a little research, 
that Snort had already solved this problem.  Before going into the solution to this problem 
however, it is necessary to understand Snort’s priorities when it is running.  While Snort is 
running as a NIDS, it has two main functions; check all traffic it sees against the rule-set it 
has, and store all of the offending packets into the MySQL database.  When Snort is given a 
high amount of traffic, or a large stream that it is reassembling, it can lead to packets 
dropping while it is writing to the database.  Dropping packets means that it lets some 
packets go by without checking them for attacks.  That is the main reason why, Snort would 
store only the entirely reassembled payload from a TCP stream.  Reassembling the packet, 
checking it for an attack, and then taking the individual packets from the TCP stream and 
storing them into the database would take too much of Snort’s time and processing power.  
This would then result in dropped packets.  So to get around that problem, Snort only stores 
the entire reassembled payload. 
 The creator of Snort, Martin Roesch, therefore wrote an add-on called Barnyard that 
would handle writing to the MySQL database for Snort.  This allows Snort to write its output 
in a language called fittingly the Snort Unified Language.  It is a strictly binary 
representation of the data and allows Snort to spend a lower amount of its processing power 
on writing the output and more of it devoted to monitoring packets.  This alone though, was 
not enough to solve the payload issue.  It turns out that with Barnyard operational a single 
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option had to be enabled in Snort’s configuration file.  This option calls for the flushing of 
streams when an attack is detected.  For example, when a TCP stream is being reconstructed 
by Snort, if an attack is shown to be held within that stream, the entire stream, meaning all of 
its individual packets, is flushed to the database.  In the case with Barnyard, they’re flushed 
into the Unified language and Barnyard then writes the individual packets into the MySQL 
database.  With the configuration file modified and the Barnyard add-on working 
successfully, the problem with Snort logging larger than normal packets was solved by mid 
October of 2005.  This turned out to be the only significant problem that presented itself, and 
the only changes made to the Snort setup throughout the rest of the second stage was 
updating its rule-set and operating version. 
4.3.2 MySQL 
During the second stage of development, the MySQL server underwent very few 
changes.  It was upgraded as necessary to newer versions and patched when needed.  The 
only major change occurred in June of 2006 near the end of this stage.  During that time, 
queries were being used to search through the database to look for all of the different types of 
attacks and the IP addresses associated with those attacks.  These queries would later on 
produce an output to the user that would allow them an easier way of seeing what they could 
replay.  This process will be covered in more detail in the next section 4.3.3.  With these 
queries though, came a minor change to the database setup.  An index was added to the 
EVENTS table of the MySQL database.  This allowed for the quick lookup of each attack 
that occurred rather than slowly going through each entry.  By doing this, the queries were 
sped up from taking close to 5 hours to complete, down to 30 seconds.  This was the only 
major change that the MySQL setup underwent for this stage of development. 
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4.3.3 Replayer 
 Starting in August of 2005, the first work to be done on the Replayer consisted of 
tracking down bugs that were left over from the first stage of development.  Specifically, the 
main goal was to find out why the packets did not look correct when they were being 
monitored by ethereal.  The first bug to be tracked down and fixed was a very minor one and 
was discovered in the payload building function of a UDP packet.  During one of the bitwise 
operations that were used to build the payload, there was a double OR operation.  This of 
course is the correct symbol if you are comparing two items within C but not for a bitwise 
operation.  The double was changed to a single OR operation and the payloads were built 
correctly from then on.  This solved the mystery as to why UDP packets were not sending 
correctly and focus then moved to the TCP packets. 
 4.3.3.1 Libnet and SQL Debugging 
 Earlier in section 4.3.1.1, the process of how the TCP packet payloads were 
discovered to be too large for a single packet was covered, and how, by varying Snort’s 
setup, this problem was solved.  Another small bug was also discovered in the payload 
building function for TCP packets.  It was very minor and was discovered by simple line by 
line debugging.  It turned out there was an extra two left in a line that essentially, doubled the 
size of the payload.  Removing this, and modifying Snort, finally produced a correctly sized 
TCP payload.  Both the UDP and TCP packet problems were solved by October of 2005.  
The ICMP packets never had any problems during the creation process. 
 Another early bug that was ironed out in September of 2005 was the SQL queries 
used to access the database.  These queries were inefficient to begin with but were also 
discovered at this time to not return the correct entries in some specific situations.  The 
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problem turned out to be a query based upon a specific port number would return the correct 
entries early on, but would skip those in the middle of the database and return entries from 
the end of the database instead.  It was also discovered that this only occurred when the 
attacks it was retrieving were switching from UDP to TCP or visa versa.  The bug was found 
to be an incorrectly written query.  This query would grab the first entry it found that 
matched the port number given, be it UDP or TCP, and would continue to grab the correct 
entries until it came upon the other protocol as the next entry.  From that point, it would grab 
the entry that occurred after all of the other previous protocol packets were passed.  For 
example, a UDP entry is grabbed as entry number 94.  A TCP packet is the next entry that 
matches that port and that entry is number 200.  Also, consider that the last UDP entry 
matching the port number is 500.  The Replayer would grab the correct entries up until entry 
94.  It would then see the TCP entry and jump to any entries after the last UDP packet at 
number 500.  After several days of analyzing other queries and studying the layout and the 
goal of the query I wanted to create, it became obvious that the query currently in place was 
attempting to do a complicated query only using simplistic methods of the SQL language.  
The solution turned out to be a simple fix and the query code was rewritten.  Appendix B 
shows the finalized query code that the Replayer uses currently. 
 The minor tweaks to the Libnet functions and the SQL queries lasted into October of 
2005.  Another change that occurred in October dealt with how the IP headers were grabbed 
from the MySQL database.  In section 4.2.3 Figure 3 shows the two different design options 
that were in consideration for use.  At the end of the first stage of development, option two 
was taken as there was no noticeable slow down when the individual IP header records were 
grabbed from the database in each pass through the loop.  However, as the database grew 
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larger I found that there were delays in grabbing IP headers further back in the database.  I 
spent several days trying to determine if there was a problem with the queries that was 
causing this delay.  In the end however, I decided to change the implementation to design 
option one shown in Figure 3.  This caused a small amount of wait time at the start of the 
program as all of the IP headers were collected, but was a small price to pay due to the fact 
that any and all delays that might occur due to queries during the actual replaying would 
disrupt the timing of the attack. 
 From that time, the ICE project was put on a hiatus as they Cyber Defense 
Competition at Iowa State University began and all of my efforts were put towards that 
endeavor.  The next move forward on the Replayer design came in January of 2006. 
 4.3.3.2 Presentation to User 
 During January the focus of the work on the Replayer was moved away from the 
functionality of the replaying itself, to the presentation given to the user.  At this time, the 
decision was made to stick with the command line interface that was in place.  I also decided 
to expand the number of search options that the user would have and also give the user an 
option to receive a list of the attacks present in the database and the IP addresses that were 
associated with those attacks.  This would allow the user to run the Replayer program to 
receive the necessary attack information to help them make a choice on what they wanted to 
replay. 
 The first step in this process was to decide what the exact type of information that 
was to be retrieved would be.  I decided that the user would get a list of every individual 
source IP address along with a listing of the different types of attacks that came from that 
address.  I also made the design decision of creating a double linked list that would store this 
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information from the database.  The first linked list would contain all of the unique source IP 
addresses.  This first list would be receiving its information from a simple SQL query that 
would retrieve each unique source IP address.  Another SQL query would then return all of 
the attack signatures each IP address in the first linked list.  The second linked list would then 
contain all of the attack signature numbers returned by the SQL query for each IP address.  
This second linked list would spawn off of each IP node.  This seemed to be a simple 
endeavor but turned out to take several weeks to correctly implement, debug, and optimize. 
Regrettably the initial code for the double linked list contained a bad memory address 
half way through the list and would crash the program each time it was run.  It was a very 
minor bug and left no information on what exactly had caused the program to crash.  Using 
DDD [13], a front end for GDB [14], I was able to track down the exact memory location and 
node in the linked list that was causing the program to crash.  As it turned out, I had forgotten 
to set a pointer in the second linked list’s attack signature nodes to NULL.  When the 
program finally cycled through the linked list to that segment of code, the pointer was 
pointing to a random memory space outside the memory allocated for the program, which in 
turn caused a segfault and crashed the program.  This took a little over a week to track and 
down due in part to my lack of familiarity with DDD and GDB. 
After the segfault had been tracked down and corrected, the next issue at hand was 
the speed at which the linked lists were getting populated.  The SQL query that were in place 
to retrieve the unique source IP addresses had no trouble executing in a sufficient amount of 
time.  The SQL query that accessed the EVENT table to retrieve each attack signature 
however was extremely slow.  It operated at such a slow rate that I first checked it to make 
sure that there was not a bug within the query itself.  It was at this point in time, that it was 
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discovered that the MySQL database needed to be indexed for a faster search time.  This was 
mentioned previously in section 4.3.2. 
 When the index was added to the EVENT table, the searches drastically decreased in 
time.  The initial searches before indexing took over 5 hours to complete.  When the EVENT 
table was indexed it took less than 30 seconds to populate the second linked list.  Once this 
was accomplished, I turned my attention to the type of storage that would be used for this 
information. 
With the database being populated from a single Snort session, the assumption was 
made that the database would not be changing once the session was complete and the user 
was ready to replay attacks from that database.  Therefore, the user would only need to run 
the Replayer once with the option to retrieve the attack information.  Thus, this information 
needed to be stored in a way that the user could access it quickly and easily without having to 
retrieve it from the MySQL database. 
Several different options were considered when looking at different storage types.  In 
the end it was narrowed down to three choices; a separate MySQL database, a comma 
separate value (CSV) file, or a text file.  The MySQL database was quickly thrown out as a 
plausible idea because it would still need to be accessed for the stored information.  The 
exact reason of storing the information in the first place was to avoid connecting to the 
database so the separate MySQL database was discarded.  The CSV and text file options 
ended up being used in conjunction.  The text file was going to be used by storing the IP 
addresses and each attack associated with that IP on a single line.  Then each sequential line 
would hold the next IP address.  I also decided that separating the IP addresses and attacks by 
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a comma would make it easier for me to access the information through the Replayer.  This 
in turn, made the text file into a CSV file and I went from there. 
Code was put in place to enable the Replayer to notify the user that a file already 
exists with attack information when the user runs the option to retrieve attack information 
from the MySQL database.  The user then has a choice of using the CSV file that contains 
the information previously gathered, or overwriting that file with new information from the 
MySQL database.  Creating these functions and correctly implementing them took several 
months in the spring of 2006.  During that time other projects began and my time to devote to 
the ICE project dropped dramatically.  Work stopped on the Replayer from April of 2006 and 
started again in June of 2006.  This was also effectively the end of the second phase of 
development. 
 
4.4 Stage Three 
 The beginning of the third stage of development began in June of 2006.  At this time, 
Snort and the MySQL database were both functioning correctly and the main focus of 
development was on the Replayer.  At the end of stage two, the collecting and organizing of 
the IP addresses and the attacks had been completed and the user now had the ability to look 
through that information to allow them to select the appropriate attacks to replay.  From this 
point, my focus would be on developing more options for the user, reorganizing the Replayer 
source code to a more object oriented design, and in depth testing. 
4.4.1 Replayer 
The options available to the user, was a large concern at the start of the third and final 
stage of development.  At that time, the only options that had been written for the user were 
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selecting the source or destination IP address of an attack or the port that an attack was run 
on, or retrieving a list of IP addresses and the attacks associated with those IP addresses.  
From this point several more options were added that were required to bring the Replayer up 
to specification with its design goals.  The main options added gave the user the ability to 
rewrite the source and destination IP addresses of the packets to be replayed.  Another two 
options that were to be created would give the user the ability to quickly see a list of captured 
attacks and to replay packets based on attacks. 
The ability to rewrite the source and destination IP addresses was one that was set to 
be implemented in the Replayer from the very beginning of the project.  The option to do so 
was not implemented until this stage of development due to other factors of the ICE project 
being of a high priority.  When I did start to code these options into the Replayer, it turned 
out to be a very simple job to implement and I was able to complete it and debug it in a 
matter of days.  The next option I added showed them the attacks that were currently stored 
in the database.  This was completed very quickly and only required to query the database 
and check the attack signatures that were stored in it.  Once that was accomplished, the final 
option I wrote in allowed the user to choose to only replay packets that were involved in a 
specific attack.  For example, if an attack had a signature number of 15 in the MySQL 
database, then choosing to replay packets that matched that signature would replay all of the 
packets in the database that matched, regardless of the source or destination IP addresses 
involved.  This was done to give the user the ability to send out a blanket of packets; all of 
the same attack type, rather than just a few that were involved with a specific IP address. 
Once these options were implemented, they were tested and several minor bugs, 
which dealt with the format of the IP addresses, were tracked down as they were discovered 
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over the next few weeks in July of 2006.  When that was completed, the Replayer at that 
point in time had the ability to retrieve specific attacks based on IP address, port, or attack 
signature and rewrite the source and destination IP addresses of those packets.  It was at this 
time that a major oversight was discovered in the way I had created the options.  In stage two 
of development, I allowed the user to create a file that contained all of the unique IP 
addresses and the attacks associated with each respective IP address.  Up until this point in 
time though, I had not given the user a way to use that information to it fullest extent and this 
became obvious to me as I looked over the options I had implemented thus far. 
When the user would run the Replayer and select a source IP address, the Replayer 
would grab all of the packets that match that source IP address from the MySQL database 
and then replay those packets out onto the wire.  If the user selected a specific attack as an 
option then the Replayer would grab every packet that matched that signature and replay all 
of the packets out onto the wire.  I had not however, written the option code to allow the user 
to use both of these options at once.  This was a huge problem that I had created for myself 
and became apparent immediately when I tried to run the Replayer with the options for a 
source IP address and an attack number.  The Replayer grabbed all of the packets matching 
the source IP address and proceeded to ignore the attack number. 
When I realized what had happened, I began to read over the options code in the 
Replayer.  In this code, I realized that I had only allowed for one option to be selected, and 
when the code reached the first option that matched the one given at the command line, it 
would exit from that function and continue to the next section of the Replayer and start to 
create the queries for the MySQL database.  The fix for this problem at first appeared to be 
very straight forward to me.  The function getopt (), which handles reading in the options, 
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would run through the state and case clauses multiple times, rather than just once, until it had 
reached the end of the options present in the command line. 
The unfortunate side effect of this change became quite evident when the queries to 
be executed were looked at.  All of the queries had been designed to only run once.  With the 
change to the getopt() option handling in effect, it made the current implementation of the 
queries obsolete and they had to be worked over.  After looking over the code, I implemented 
several variables that would act as counters.  These counters would keep track of the number 
of options that were passed in from the command line.  I then added another segment of a 
query whose sole purpose was to combine two or more of the previous query statements that 
were coded in.  This enabled the Replayer to grab the options from the command line, count 
how many options there were, take each of those options and create the correct query for 
each of them, and then combine those separate query statements into one single statement 
and access the database.  The original queries did have to have a few minor adjustments 
made to them in order for them to work as part of a larger one if there was more than one 
option, but nothing that was changed affected the performance of them. 
4.4.1.1 Code Cleanup 
Once the ability for the user to select multiple options had been correctly 
implemented, I decided to spend the next month going over the Replayer code in detail and 
reorganizing it.  The experience with the SQL queries made me realize that their might be 
other gross and obvious oversights that I had created in the code.  Another reason I had was a 
direct result of the way the Replayer had been written.  There were many times that coding 
on the Replayer did not occur for several months and each time I came back and continued 
coding I would be working on a different section of the Replayer.  This had lead to a working 
 40
Replayer but it was rather disjoint in the way the code was held together.  Due to this, it was 
becoming exceedingly obvious that implementing new functionality in the future would be 
an extreme hassle.  It was for these reasons that reorganizing the code, geared specifically 
towards a more object oriented design, seemed to be in the best interests of the Replayer and 
its future developers. 
 One of the first parts to be reorganized was the global variables.  Many of these were 
used to create the IP header, the MySQL database connections, and the Libnet headers and 
had been created at the very beginning of the Replayer.  At that moment, I had moved several 
sections of code off of the main source file and into their own source file.  With this change, 
having the global variables in such a free standing state hindered the reorganization of the 
source code due to conflicts in access to the variables.  To combat this, I decided that these 
initial variables would serve their purpose much more efficiently and cleanly if they were 
grouped into their own separate structures and source file.  Once that was accomplished, it 
was much easier to move about the code and pass a structure into the various Libnet 
functions rather than passing an enormous amount of separate variables.  Appendix C shows 
the global variables before the code clean up and the newly created structures in use after the 
clean up. 
 4.4.1.2 MySQL Configuration File 
 Once the Replayer had undergone the code reorganization, it was a much cleaner 
looking program.  It had been changed to be much more module and made adding additional 
playback functionality much easier than before.  At this time, the idea of configuration files 
being used for the MySQL database connection started to surface.  During the reorganization 
of the code, I noticed that the MySQL database information was hard-coded into the 
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Replayer.  This meant that in order to have the Replayer connect to a different MySQL 
database, the lines of code containing that information would have to be modified and the 
Replayer itself would have to be recompiled. 
 I decided at that point in time, that a configuration file was desperately needed for this 
information as it was inconceivable to require the user to recompile the Replayer each time 
the database might change.  After reviewing exactly what information the Replayer needed to 
connect to the database, I implemented code that would read in a configuration file of my 
design.  This configuration file would hold the server’s hostname, the username, the 
password, and the database to connect to.  Example entries in the configuration file can be 
seen in Appendix D.  During the development of this simple configuration file, the idea that 
more than one server might be in use by a user was taken into consideration.  Therefore, the 
configuration file can contain more than one server entry and each entry is recognized by the 
number at the beginning of an entry.  In this way, the user can specify at the command line 
what entry to use and can store multiple databases’ connection information in one 
configuration file. 
 A small problem that developed from this additional option was how it was 
executed.  Before this option was in place, the first action that the Replayer would execute 
would be the code to connect to the database.  After much mulling, I determined the best 
course was to split up the area that handles the options.  It was my intention that by doing so 
would allow the Replayer to grab the configuration file option, connect to the database, and 
then resume its normal process of checking for additional options that were used on the 
command line.  Figure 6 below shows the different processes the Replayer used before and 
after the change.  
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 Figure 6. Initial and Revamped Option Retrieval and Database Connection Designs 
  4.4.1.3 TCP Three-Way Handshake 
At this point of development on the Replayer it was December 2006.  After a small 
amount of testing, which will be covered in detail in the next chapter, I discovered a fatal 
flaw in attacks that were carried out over a TCP stream.  More specifically, attacks that 
involved two way communications between the Replayer and the target would fail 100 
percent of the time.  These types of attacks would involve the target machine running any 
service that requires two way communications, and the attack itself would have multiple 
packets to it. The failure was caused by the Replayer’s lack of ability to correctly respond to 
 43
the target.  This also brought up an error that was not recognized in the way Snort handles 
TCP stream attacks until this testing occurred. 
 When Snort flushes and stores the TCP stream from an attack that it has monitored, it 
does not include the three-way handshake from the stream. A three-way handshake is the 
method that occurs during the initialization of a TCP connection.  This led me to realize that 
when the Replayer would replay a TCP stream attack, it would fail immediately due to the 
Replayer and the target not creating a successful handshake for the exchange of the attack 
packets.  I also discovered that the Replayer had an inherent flaw when replaying TCP stream 
attacks even if the handshake was stored with the stream.  Given that the Replayer had made 
a successful connection with a target machine through the three-way handshake, the 
acknowledgment numbers of the Replayer’s packets would be the same as they were from 
the MySQL database.  In order for a TCP packet to be accepted by the target however, the 
acknowledgment numbers must match the sequence numbers that were given by the target 
for that particular connection.  I had not taken this into account when designing the replaying 
functionality of the Replayer and therefore every packet that the Replayer would send over 
the wire to a target via a TCP stream would be rejected and the target would try to reset the 
connection. 
 After two days of going over the Replayer’s code and considering my design choices, 
I decided to implement another option that would allow for the Replayer to connect via a 
three-way handshake and modify the acknowledgement numbers of its packets to correctly 
match the sequence numbers being sent from the target.  My decision to make this an option 
for the user was made by considering that not all of the attacks that the Replayer will send 
will be TCP based, and that not all of those TCP attacks would involve multiple packets.  
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Therefore, it would be up to the user to decide when to have the Replayer initiate a three-way 
handshake and modify the acknowledgement numbers for a TCP attack. 
 The design and implementation of this option was by far the most involved of the 
project.  It meant that not only would the Replayer be replaying packets out to a target, but it 
would also be monitoring traffic from the target for specific information, such as the 
acknowledgement numbers.  This brought timing concerns to the forefront of my mind when 
I began to develop the code and would be the cause of most of the problems in correctly 
creating the functionality.   
 The first step in the implementation process of this option was to design the three-
way handshake.  This would be handled in a new function called IceTWH.  For IceTWH to 
work, the Replayer would send out an initial TCP packet correctly formatted with the SYN 
flag set to act as the first packet in a three-way handshake.  The target would receive that 
packet and reply to the Replayer with the second packet in the handshake that has the SYN 
and ACK flags set.  The Replayer would then grab that packet from the network, locate the 
sequence number of the packet, and reply back to the target with that sequence number as the 
third packets acknowledgement number.  This third packet would also have the ACK flag set.  
The design of the three-way handshake was fairly simple.  I found out that the 
implementation of it would not be. 
To accomplish the task of the three-way handshake, the libpcap library, which was 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, would be used to build a limited traffic sniffer.  The objective 
of this traffic sniffer would be to grab the second packet containing the SYN and ACK flags 
from the target and to extract the sequence number from it.  Before that was done though, the 
initial SYN packet was created using Libnet.  I made this packet static, in that there is no 
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dynamic information contained within the packet except for the target’s IP address.  All of 
the TCP options in this packet were hard coded into it and are not meant to change.  The 
standard TCP build function from Libnet was then used along with the TCP build options 
function to create the packet.  This permitted me to correctly build a standard first stage SYN 
packet for the three-way handshake. 
Once that was accomplished, I used the tutorial [15] from the creator of Tcpdump as a 
primer to writing my own sniffer.  The initial difficulty I had with creating the sniffer had 
less to do with the syntax of libpcap and more to do with the timing and placement of it in 
relation to the Libnet functions that were responsible for creating and sending out the three-
way handshake packets.  My original version of the IceTWH function had the initial SYN 
packet created and sent out to the target.  After that first packet was sent, the sniffer then 
initialized itself and started to monitor the network.  I found out quite quickly though that the 
initialization time of the libpcap library and its corresponding functions, requires a longer 
amount of time than it takes the target machine to reply back to the Replayer with the second 
packet of the three-way handshake.  This resulted in the reply packet being missed by the 
Replayer, the IceTWH function would exit due to the failure of the sniffer, and the replaying 
of the attack would continue on from that point and fail. 
When the timing issue presented itself, I began to consider whether to fork off or 
thread the process of sniffing from the main three-way handshake function in order for it to 
run simultaneously and monitor the network correctly.  As it unfolded though, the real 
solution was very simple and easy to implement.  It was the initialization of the libpcap 
functions and variables that created the timing issue mentioned previously.  By moving the 
initialization segment of code to the start of the IceTWH function, I was able to create the 
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SYN packet, and then call the sniffer code immediately afterwards without any delay.  With 
the initialization process already taken care of, the sniffer actually picked up my initial SYN 
packet as well it was so fast.  This solved the timing issue I had and allowed the Replayer to 
grab the correct sequence number from the target’s SYN and ACK packet reply. 
From that point, I took the sequence number and put it into the third and final packet 
of the handshake as the acknowledgement number.  That packet was then created and sent to 
the target to complete the handshake.  It was then a matter of monitoring the packets that 
were returning and modifying the acknowledgement number on the Replayer’s packets by 
the correct amount for the size of each payload.  I should also note that during the testing of 
this section of the Replayer’s functionality I was spoofing a live machine on the network.  
This resulted in a race condition between the Replayer and the live machine that was being 
spoofed and would cause a 33 percent failure rate in the Replayer due to the TCP connection 
being disrupted.  However, during a test without spoofing a live machine on the test network, 
the success rate was between 90 and 100 percent.  Work that needs to be completed on this 
section is discussed in Chapter 6 FUTURE WORK. 
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CHAPTER 5. TESTING 
  
 Testing of the various components of the ICE project was ongoing through out the 
development process.  Tests of the Snort and MySQL configurations were necessary with 
their initial setup and when bugs were discovered.  Testing of the Replayer was conducted 
ad-hoc and the many functions contained within the Replayer were debugged and optimized 
during development.  Near the end of the third development stage a testing environment was 
setup to ensure that, along with the packets getting replayed correctly from the Replayer, the 
packets were also replicating the attack correctly against the target machine. 
 
5.1 Testing Methodology 
 I already had confirmed from my testing done in the previous stages that the Replayer 
did in fact replay the attack packets and that those packets pushed out onto the network.  The 
main question I had was whether or not, given an identical target machine and environment, 
that the Replayer could trigger an actual attack.  In order to accomplish this, I would need a 
test environment that would allow me to play out an attack against a target, monitor and 
capture that test using Snort and MySQL and then replay the same attack against the same 
target using the Replayer.  By following these steps, I would be able to monitor the target 
machine and observer whether or not the Replayer was capable of causing the same end 
result on the target machine as the original attack had done.  Before I could start however, I 




5.2 Test Environment 
 The test environment that I planned to setup would contain three machines.  One of 
the machines would contain the Replayer and the MySQL database for the Replayer.  The 
second machine would contain Snort and the third machine would be a standard Windows 
XP box and act as a target.  When considering how to setup these machines, it came to my 
attention that I could make use of the VMWare [16] application in this scenario.   
I had previously worked with fellow graduate student Nate Karstens on a presentation 
for the Information Assurance Student Group [17] and had helped to create a disk image that 
contained VMWare for that presentation.  On that particular image, there were four operating 
systems in use.  The first operating system was Fedora Core 4 and was the host operating 
system that ran the VMWare software and tools.  The other three operating systems were all 
virtualized and included a Windows XP box, a FreeBSD 6.1 system with Snort installed, and 
a FreeBSD 6.1 system.  I worked and modified the image for a day and decided that it would 
suit my needs as a test environment.  The figure below shows the layout of virtualized 
network.  To avoid any confusion, I have labeled the Windows XP box as machine T since it 
is the target machine, the FreeBSD boxes as machines S and A for Snort and Attacker 
respectively, and the Fedora Core 4 as machine H because it is the host.  
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Figure 7. Test Environment 
I then added machine H to the same network that the ICE development machine was 
currently sitting on.  Once that was finished, it was a two step transfer to move a copy of the 
Replayer executable from the development machine over to machine A.  I transferred the 
executable using SFTP from the development machine to machine H and then used SFTP 
again to transfer it from machine H to machine A.  This allowed me to make modifications to 
the Replayer, recompile it, and then quickly transfer the new executable into the test 
environment. 
Machine A also had Snort and a MySQL database installed onto it.  These, along with 
the Replayer, turned it into a full version of ICE and allowed it to monitor the test 
environment’s network for attacks and store them into the MySQL database.  These attacks 
could then be replayed by the Replayer running on machine A.  I also installed Snort onto 
machine S.  This created an independent Snort machine that would be used to confirm that 
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the replayed attack packets would trigger the IDS.  Machine H was also given Metasploit 
[18] which would allow me to send pre-made attacks to machine T. 
 
5.3 Test Execution 
 With the test environment setup and full functional, I began to go through the 
Metasploit database and look for an attack that would be advanced enough to test the full 
functionality of the Replayer, but not so advanced that it was beyond what the Replayer was 
designed for.  Most of the attacks stored in the Metasploit database are fairly simple, one shot 
attacks and would do nicely for a test.  I finally decided upon the RPC DCOM exploit [19] 
that was known to help transfer the blaster worm [20] in mid 2003.  The exploit in Metasploit 
was a simple code execution that used the RPC DCOM exploit to gain access to the target 
Windows XP machine.  With the exploit chosen, I went about setting up for the actual test. 
 The first step I took was to initialize Metasploit on machine H.  Once Metasploit was 
up and running, I traversed through the web based GUI and selected the RPC DCOM exploit 
and entered the IP address of machine T.  Before executing the exploit though, I turned on 
Snort and MySQL on machine A so I could capture the attack packets and store them for the 
Replayer.  When I was confident that machine A was running correctly, I executed the RCP 
DCOM exploit against machine T.  With in several seconds of the exploits execution, a 
shutdown warning box appeared on the screen and machine T rebooted in several seconds. 
 The exploit had worked correctly and machine T had to restart.  The logs from 
machine A also indicated that Snort had successfully captured the attack and that those attack 
packets had been stored in the MySQL database.  At this juncture of the testing, I turned on 
Snort on machine S.  This would allow an independent monitoring of the Replayer’s packets 
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and would, hopefully, show the exact same warnings and captured packets the occurred with 
the original attack. 
 Once machine T was back online, I ran the Replayer with the commands that told it to 
replay all attacks in the database with the destination address of machine T.  This had the 
desired effect of causing the Replayer to replay the entire attack stream that had been stored 
in the MySQL database.  Once the packets had been replayed, I checked machine T and was 
greeted with the standard screen and no shutdown warning.  The replayed attack had failed to 
generate the same end result as the original attack.  However, machine S which was running 
Snort, did capture all of the packets and the replayed attack had triggered all of the same 
warnings.  It was at this point in time that I did some research into the attack, and became 
aware of the fact that Snort was not recording the initial three way handshake of the TCP 
attack stream being used, and that the acknowledgement numbers would have to be modified 
in order for the attack to be replicated successfully.  I took these findings and went back to 
work on the Replayer to make the necessary modifications, all of which has been 
documented in Chapter 4 section 4.4.1.3.  It should be noted here however, that the testing 
environment was used extensively during this time period to help with the development of 
the TCP handshake module. 
 When the development of the TCP hand-shake module had concluded, I transferred 
the latest copy of the Replayer over to machine H and then on to machine A.  I then ran the 
Replayer with the same commands as I had with the initial test and the results were 
satisfactory.  Machine A successfully connected to the target machine T, and executed the 
RPC DCOM exploit on it with out trouble.  This caused machine T to reboot and machine S 
also recorded the attack successfully.  Due to time constraints, this was the only exploit 
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tested extensively with the Replayer.  It showed however, that the Replayer could not only 
simply replay the packets onto the network, but when given the same type of target machine, 




Chapter 6. FUTURE WORK 
 
 There are two main areas of ICE, both within the Replayer, that require attention by 
future developers; the graphical user interface (GUI) and the three-way handshake module.  
The GUI aspect of the Replayer has not left the design stage and no actual code has been 
written to accomplish this task aside from several test programs to understand GTK, the 
graphics library being used for it.  The three-way handshake code correctly functions at this 
moment but has timing issues and is not written in a very efficient manner at this point in 
time. 
 
6.1 Graphical User Interface 
 The GUI for the Replayer has been briefly looked at.  It will consist of a simple front 
end that will allow the user to input the target IP address to which the replayed attacks will be 
sent, a list of the attacks available to select from and their corresponding original source IP 
addresses, and the ability to select attacks to send based on the ports used.  This will give the 
user access to all of the options that they would have if they were running the Replayer from 
the command line.  In fact, the GUI will simply be a translator in which it will take the user’s 
input and create the corresponding command to be executed on the command line.  This 
should allow for the Replayer code itself to remain untouched and only require an 





6.2 Monitoring Sequence Numbers 
 Part of the code within the three-way handshake function uses libpcap to create a 
sniffer to monitor the incoming reply packets from the target machine.  The implementation 
of this section of the code is very inefficient due to the sniffer being called after each packet 
is written out by the Replayer.  The sniffer then monitors for the packet that is sent in reply to 
the Replayer’s last sent packet.  The sequence number from the packet grabbed by the sniffer 
is then taken and used as the acknowledgment number in the next packet sent by the 
Replayer. 
 A cleaner way to do this would be to create a thread for the sniffer that would always 
be running during an attack that had invoked the three-way handshake option.  This would 
allow for the Replayer to avoid calling the sniffer after each packet had been sent and remove 
the possibility that the sniffer would miss the target’s reply packet.  In section 4.4.1, it was 
covered that the sniffer invoked during the three-way handshake did not miss the reply 
packet and was indeed so fast that it picked up the initial SYN packet sent by the Replayer.  
Even with this information however, it would still serve the Replayer better to have the 
sniffer handled in its own thread instead of constantly being recalled to operate between each 
packet sent by the Replayer. 
 
6.3 MySQL Database Indexing 
 Another possible cause of the latency from the MySQL database could be the fact that 
the IP, TCP, and UDP header tables are not indexed.  As was mentioned in section 4.3.2, the 
EVENTS table was indexed to provide faster searching capabilities when producing the 
attack information for the user.  By indexing the IP, TCP, and UDP header tables, a similar 
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result should be expected to occur.  This would allow for design option two from Figure 3 to 























CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
 The progress made on the ICE project up to this point has created a solid foundation 
on which later developments and refinements of the software can occur.  The main 
functionality is in place and each component has reached a point that I consider satisfactory.  
The Snort setup and initialization correctly monitors and stores every packet from an attack 
stream that it detects.  The MySQL database is quick and efficient at handling data requests 
and holds all of the data from the Snort output.  The Replayer at this time correctly takes the 
information stored in the MySQL database and replays the attack onto a network. 
 The Replayer has accomplished what it was designed to do and has achieved its goal.  
That is not to say that there are not improvements that can be done to it.  As talked about in 
Chapter 6, there are a few issues that need to be worked on in the future.  Also, the ability for 
the Replayer to handle more complicated attacks and perhaps handle data not retrieved from 
a Snort output could be looked at as well.  This would allow the Replayer to be used with 
other attack data as long as that data was stored in a MySQL database.  However, as stated in 
Chapter 1, the area of replaying attacks is large and holds many tools that can help replay 
attacks in various ways.  The Replayer covers Snort-based output nicely and that may be all 






























APPENDIX B. SQL Code 
 
 
while(x > 0){ 
 y++; //increase for each choice 
  switch(selection[y]){ 
   case S_PORT: 
    sprintf(spq1, "tcphdr.tcp_sport = %s", choice[y]); 
    sprintf(spq2, "udphdr.udp_sport = %s", choice[y]); 
    break; 
   case D_PORT: 
    sprintf(dpq1, "tcphdr.tcp_dport = %s", choice[y]); 
    sprintf(dpq2, "udphdr.udp_dport = %s", choice[y]); 
    break; 
   case IP_SRC: 
    sprintf(isq1, "iphdr.ip_src = INET_ATON('%s')", choice[y]); 
    break; 
   case IP_DST: 
    sprintf(idq1, "iphdr.ip_dst = INET_ATON('%s')", choice[y]); 
    break; 
   case ATTACK: 
    attk = atoi(choice[y]); 
    break; 
     
  } 
  
 x--; //decrease to track the number of choices left to take 
} 
  
sprintf(query, "SELECT iphdr.* from iphdr WHERE "); 
  
while (y > 0){ 
 switch(selection[y]){ 
     case S_PORT:  
     sprintf(where,  "( iphdr.cid IN ( SELECT tcphdr.cid FROM tcphdr 
WHERE %s) OR iphdr.cid IN ( SELECT udphdr.cid FROM udphdr WHERE %s))", spq1,spq2); 
     sprintf(query, "%s %s ", query, where);   
   
     break; 
      
     case D_PORT: 
     sprintf(where,  "( iphdr.cid IN ( SELECT tcphdr.cid FROM tcphdr 
WHERE %s) OR iphdr.cid IN ( SELECT udphdr.cid FROM udphdr WHERE %s))", dpq1,dpq2); 
     sprintf(query, "%s %s ", query, where); 
     break; 
    
     case IP_SRC: 
     sprintf(where, "%s", isq1); 
     sprintf(query, "%s %s", query, where); 
     break; 
    
     case IP_DST: 
     sprintf(where, "%s", idq1); 
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     sprintf(query, "%s %s", query, where); 
     break; 
    
     case ATTACK: 
     sprintf(where, "( iphdr.cid IN ( SELECT event.cid FROM event 
WHERE event.signature = %d))", attk); 
     sprintf(query, "%s %s", query, where); 
     break; 
   } 
   if(y >1) //this next line is to append several queries together for multiple options 
    sprintf(query, "%s AND ", query);  




APPENDIX C. GLOBAL VARIABLES AND STRUCTURES 
 
 







MYSQL *conn, *TCP_conn, *UDP_conn, *ICMP_conn, *TIME_conn; 
MYSQL_RES  *ip, *attk, *time_res; 
MYSQL_ROW ip_row, sig_row, time_row; 









char ip_Sadd[17], ip_Dadd[17]; 
bool checkipS, checkipD; 
int subPacket_s; 
 
///IP INFO STORAGE/// 
u_long  IP_src; 








u_char  IP_proto; 
 
 
After Code Cleanup 
typedef struct g_mysql{  //Struct holds the MYSQL connection information 
   
///MYSQL/// 
 MYSQL *conn, *TCP_conn, *UDP_conn, *ICMP_conn, *TIME_conn; 
 MYSQL_RES  *ip, *attk, *time_res; 
 MYSQL_ROW ip_row, sig_row, time_row; 
 char *server, *user, *password, *database; 
 char serv[20], use[20], pass[20], data[20]; 






typedef struct g_libnet{   
 libnet_t* l; 
 libnet_ptag_t t; 
 int cidNum; 




typedef struct g_address{  //Struct for the IP address 
    //along with values to store user input address 
 char ip_Sadd[17], ip_Dadd[17]; 
 bool checkipS, checkipD; 
 u_char opt_t[1000]; 
 u_long AckHold; 
 u_short PortHold; 
 int option_s;  
   
 ///IP INFO STORAGE/// 
 u_long  IP_src; 
 u_long  IP_dst; 
 u_short IP_ver; 
 u_short IP_len; 
 u_char IP_tos; 
 u_short IP_id; 
 u_short IP_flags; 
 u_int IP_off; 
 u_char IP_ttl; 
 u_char  IP_proto; 
}addressglob; 
  
typedef struct g_pcap{    //libpcap struct used for sniffing 
 pcap_t *handle;     
 char *dev;     
 char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];  
 struct bpf_program fp;    
 bpf_u_int32 mask;     
 bpf_u_int32 net;     
 struct pcap_pkthdr header;   
 const u_char *packet;    
 int num_packets; 
}pcapglob; 
 
mysqlglob mytest;   //Declaring these structures here 
addressglob addytest;   //allows them global access across the program 
libnetglob libtest;    //removing problems with pointers and scope issues 
pcapglob pcaptest; 
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